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Book Review
Nicholas J. Muliany & Peter R. Handford, Tort Liabilityfor Psychiatric
Damage, Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1993. Pp. Iv, 333.
One of tort law's great failures is its treatment of claims for psychiatric
damage (or, to use a misleading but more popular term, nervous shock').
While a great deal of progress has been made since the days when liability
would lie only if a plaintiff also suffered physical injury', or at least
reasonably feared for her personal safety3 , the law remains largely
unsatisfactory and in need of reform. Illogical and arbitrary rules abound
with the result that worthy claimants are often denied compensation.
Recent attempts at clarification and rationalization by the House of
Lords 4 and the High Court of Australia5 have been at best partially
successful. When next presented with an opportunity to settle the issues
involved, the Supreme Court of Canada would do well to avail itself of
Mullany & Handford's Tort Liabilityfor PsychiatricDamage.
That text contains an impressive and exhaustive treatment of the
subject matter. Believing that no jurisdiction has a monopoly on excellence, Mullany & Handford consciously adopt the style of Professor
Fleming's The Law of Torts6 and approach their topic from a comparative
perspective.7 Thus, while its starting point for discussion is typically
English or Australian law, Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage includes a thorough discussion of the Canadian and American positions,
and also provides illuminating references from jurisdictions as diverse as
New Zealand, Germany, France, Israel and South Africa. The method is
entirely apposite and will be welcome in this country. Because the need
to impose limitations on the potentially expansive scope of liability for
psychiatric damage has been addressed in every legal system, it is often
possible to gain insights by looking abroad. Moreover, the Supreme

1. Transient shock is not compensable; liability lies, if at all, only for the physical and mental
consequences of such shock.
2. Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.).
3. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 699.
4. Alcock v. ChiefConstable of South Yorkshire Police, [19921 1 A.C. 310.

5. Jaensch v. Coffey (1985), 155 C.L.R. 549.
6. The most recent edition is John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Sydney: Law Book
Co., 1992).
7. Nicholas J. Mullany & Peter R. Handford, Tort LiabilityforPsychiatricDamage (Sydney:

Law Book Co.. 1993) at ix.

Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage

Court of Canada has been refreshingly cosmopolitan in its willingness to
consider the wisdom of foreign decisions.8
Mullany & Handford not only look beyond jurisdictional boundaries,
but beyond disciplinary boundaries as well. Outside of the United States,
the common law insists that mere mental distress (e.g. worry, anxiety,
grief, disappointment and anger) is not compensable; to recover, a
plaintiff must establish that he suffered a "recognizable psychiatric
illness." After a comprehensive examination of the medical evidence, the
authors conclude that the rule may be difficult to justify. 9 The distinction
between mere mental distress on the one hand and recognizable psychiatric illness on the other is largely the product of legal, rather than
medical, thought. While modem science can certainly distinguish common human responses from severe psychiatric disorders (such as acute
schizophrenia), the line between "normal" and "abnormal" reaction can
become blurred by mild conditions shading imperceptibly into debilitating states. Consequently, the authors propose that the scope of tort
liability should be broadened to encompass a greater range of injury.
Indeed, the theme of expansive reform pervades Tort Liability for
PsychiatricDamage. While made in reference to the rule which denies
relief for losses which occur because a person realizes that she could have
been in the place of an injured person °, the following passage reveals
Mullany & Handford's general approach to the law regarding recovery
for psychiatric damage:
The courts must break free completely of the shackles of traditionalism
and extreme over-caution as well as the persisting scepticism surrounding
claims of this nature. ... Irrelevant distinctions ... must not be allowed to
hinder the development of sound and consistent principle."
The book's structure is based on the various conditions and limitations
that the courts have imposed on the availability of relief. Thus, consideration is given in separate chapters to the relationship between the plaintiff
and the primary victim of an accident, the plaintiff's proximity to an
accident in time and space, the means by which the plaintiff learned of an
accident, the need for sudden impact on the plaintiff, the source of the
plaintiff's shock, and the class of potential plaintiffs. In each instance, the
authors trace the development of the law up to its current position, and

8. See e.g. Norsk PacificSteamship Co. v. CanadianNationalRailivayCo. (1992), 91 D.L.R.

(4th) 289 (S.C.C.).
9. Supra, note 7, at 56.

10. Wilks v. Haines (1991), Aust. Torts Rep. 81-078. In contrast, liability is possible if a
plaintiff suffers psychiatric damage as a result of witnessing another person narrowly avoid
death or injury: see e.g. Dooley v. CammellLaird & Co. Ltd., [1951] I Lloyd's Rep. 271.
11. Supra, note 7, at 222.
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then suggest how it could be improved. As a result, the text should prove
useful not only as a reference tool, but also as catalyst for change; it will
enable the student and the lawyer to know what the law is, but it will also
provide the advocate, the judge and the legislator with a glimpse of what
the law perhaps ought to be.
The reader will likely ffid herself in agreement with many of Mullany
& Handford's proposals. For example, there does not appear to be any
logical reason to confine recovery to plaintiffs who are tied by blood or
social relations to the primary victim of the accident. It often will be
foreseeable that like spouses, parents and children, mere bystanders will
suffer psychiatric illness as a result of witnessing a particularly gruesome
tragedy.12 Similarly, it is difficult to conceive of ajustification for the rule
that restricts recovery to individuals who suffer damage as a result of
directly witnessing an accident or its immediate aftermath. 3 A mother's
psychiatric illness may be no less foreseeable and no less worthy of
compensation merely because she was prevented by circumstance from
quickly obtaining information pertaining to her son's negligently caused
death.1 4 Given its rejection of the House of Lords' recent conservatism 5
and its own willingness to expand the scope of tort liability in other
areas 6 , it can be anticipated that the Supreme Court of Canada might at
leastentertain the possibility of adopting some of the proposals advocated
in Tort Liabilityfor PsychiatricDamage.
Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that all of Mullany & Handford's
recommendations will be embraced soon, if ever. The law is generally a
pragmatic exercise in which initial premises are seldom followed to their
ultimate conclusions, and that is nowhere more true than in tort law's
treatment of compensation for psychiatric damage. For policy reasons,
courts have occasionally refused to extend the scope of liability despite
the recognition that logic might suggest a contrary course. 7 And whether
justified or unjustified, concerns regarding unfair or excessive liability
and scepticism regarding the validity of psychiatric injury will surely

12. Supra, note 7 at 128 ff.
13. Ibid., at 136 ff.
14. See e.g. Rhodesv. CanadianNationalRailway(1990),75 D.L.R. (4th) 248 (B.C.C.A.) per
Taylor J.A. (Wood J.A. concurring).
15. See e.g. Murphy v. Brentwood DistrictCouncil, [1991] 1 A.C. 398.
16. See e.g. Norsk PacificSteamship Co. v. CanadianNationalRailway Co., supra,note 8;
Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159.

17. Thus, for fear of opening the floodgates to liability, courts continue to distinguish between
plaintiffs who witness an accident or its aftermath and plaintiffs who receive communication
of an accident, though clearly it is no less foreseeable that the latter will suffer psychiatric
damage: see e.g. Jaensch v. Coffey, supra,note 5; Anderson v. Smith (1990), 101 F.L.R. 34 at

49-50, per Nader J.
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continue to result in the rejection of some claims, however meritorious.
Thus, Canadian courts may never fully endorse the suggestion that
recovery should be possible where bad news is broken accurately but
badly, as when a person foreseeably suffers psychiatric damage after a
police officer or nurse does not relay news of a family tragedy as gently
as is reasonably possible. 18 No matter-constructive criticism is always
welcome. Even if they do not invariably help to effect substantive
reforms, Mullany & Handford's efforts to reveal arbitrariness and inconsistency in the law should encourage judges to acknowledge more often
the true basis of their decisions.
Finally, Tort Liabilityfor PsychiatricDamage draws upon the compelling, often tragic, facts that have given rise to actions for psychiatric
illness.19 Claims have been pursued as a result of being denied a make-up
examination in a Criminal Procedure course °, being attacked by a
chimpanzee', learning of a sister's death through "extra-sensory empathy" 22 , watching a relative's coffin tumble out of the back of a hearse23,
and witnessing a ceremonial circumcision go terribly wrong.24 Mullany
& Handford's text is consequently not only among the best written and
most informative works on the market, itis also among the most readable.
Reviewed by Mitchell McInnes.*

18. Supra, note 7, at 190-191.
19. Inparticular, the facts of Masibav. ConstantiaInsuranceCo. Ltd., 1982 (4) S.A. 333 (C)
(South Africa), too complex to be recounted here, seem better suited to the bizarre imagination
of a first year torts examiner than to the real world.
20. McBeth v. Dalhousie University (1986), 173 A.P.R. 224 (N.S.C.A.).
21. Lindley i%Knowlton (1918), 176 P. 440 (Cal.).
22. Burke v. Pan-AmericanWorldAinvays Co. 484 F. Supp. 850 (1980).
23. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394.
24. Ibrahim (A Minor) v. Muhammad (Unreported, Q.B.D., 21 May 1984).
* B.A., LL.B. (Alberta), LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge).

